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UNDERSTANDING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE BAKER'S DOZEN
MYTHS
Edith Brown Weiss*
Until recently, little attention has been given to whether
states and other actors comply with the agreements they nego-
tiate. The assumption has been that most states comply with
most international law most of the time. There is, however,
strong reason to question this assumption. As was apparent in
the Breard case,1 which involved implementation and compli-
ance with the consular convention, states do not necessarily
comply with the international agreements they join, particularly
when they involve implementation at the provincial/state and
local levels.
Since 1972, the number of international legal instruments
concerning the environment has risen dramatically. As of De-
cember 1998, there were more than 1000 legal instruments
focusing on the environment or having one or more important
provisions concerned with environmental issues; most of these
instruments have been negotiated since 1972.2 There has also
been a sharp increase in the number of nonbinding legal instru-
ments (or soft law) concerned with the environment.
Francis Cabell Brown Professor of International Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. The author thanks Harold K Jacobson for his superb collaboration in
the book Engaging Countries, infra note 5, and Christina Carroll and Brett
Frischmann for their assistance with this article.
1. Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd, 134 F.3d 622
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub no., Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998). For
an analysis of the Breard case, see commentaries by Jonathon Charney & W. Michael
Reisman, Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Louis Henkin, Carlos Vazquez, Jordan
Paust, Lori Damrosch, Frederic Kirgis, and Anne-Marie Slaughter in Agora: Breard,
92 AMi J. INT'L L. 664 (1998).
2. These include multilateral, bilateral, and important nonbinding legal instru-
ments. See EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: BASIC
INSTRUMtENTS AND REFERENCES 8-144, 160-66 (1992) [hereinafter BASIC VOLUMEJ;
EDITH BROWN WEISS, ET AL., II INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: BASIC INSTRU-
MENTS AND REFERENCES (SuPP. 1999) [hereinafter 1999 SUPPLEMENT].
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International environmental agreements are viewed as an
important means for influencing the behavior of countries and
other actors such as subnational governmental units, interna-
tional organizations, multinational corporations and national
industries, nongovernmental organizations, transnational coali-
tions, and individuals. Negotiating and implementing the inter-
national agreements is time-consuming and costly. While the
international community has become more efficient at negotiat-
ing the agreements, it still often requires more time to put
them into effect than to negotiate them.3 Some agreements
that are negotiated never go into effect.'
Compliance with international agreements has long been
neglected as an important issue in international law, except for
compliance with agreements curtailing the use of force. In in-
ternational environmental law, this occurs in part because polit-
ical capital comes from negotiating new agreements, not from
complying with those agreements already negotiated.5 This also
occurs for other reasons: it is often hard to measure compliance;
effectiveness of the agreement does not necessarily correlate
with compliance of the agreement; and resources to promote
compliance have often been minimal.6
This article presents the Baker's Dozen Myths about compli-
ance. It is based on a large international, multidisciplinary
research program that studied national compliance by eight
3. See Edith Brown Weiss, International Environmental Law: Contemporary Is-
sues and the Emergence of a New World Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 675, 695 (1993). For
example, it took longer to put the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657
(1989), into effect than it did to negotiate it. See id.
4. For example, the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource
Activities, June 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868 (1988), has not yet entered into force. The
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, July 9,
1985, reprinted in 15 ENvTL. POLy & L. 64 (1985), was negotiated in 1985 but did
not enter into force until over ten years later.
5. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTER-
NATIONAL ENViRONMENTAL ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson, eds.
1998) [hereinafter ENGAGING COUNTRIES]; Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson,
Why Do States Comply with International Agreements?, 1 HUMAN DIMENSIONS Q. 1
(1966); see also Renald B. Mitchell, INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRON-
MENTAL POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE (1994).
6. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 5.
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countries and the European Union with five agreements over
the lifetime of the agreements.'
The myths are set in an international legal system that is in
a process of transition from a state-centered, hierarchical, and
static structure to one that consists of networks of actors and is
non-hierarchical and dynamic. Moreover, the framework for
compliance has changed from one that is hierarchical and "top
down" to one that involves dynamic interactions between states
and non-state actors and international and domestic constituen-
cies across state lines. These points are developed below.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established a new legal
order based on sovereign, independent, territorially defined
states, each striving to maintain political independence and
territorial integrity.' The order was hierarchical since states
controlled everything within their jurisdiction, and it was based
on equality among sovereign states. The resulting system was
European and reflected the prevailing laissez faire philosophy
in which all states were equally free to pursue their own inter-
ests, whatever their underlying economic or political differences.
As sovereign states emerged across the world, the system of
international law based thereon also spread. International law
was aptly defined as the "body of rules and principles of action"
binding upon states in their relations with each other.'
The classical view of international law focused exclusively on
states and binding legal instruments to provide solutions to
problems that were clearly defined. It assumed that states
complied with their international obligations. There was a
7. See id. (assessing compliance of eight countries, Brazil, Cameroon, China,
Hungary, India, Japan, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, the United States, and
the European Union, with five agreements: the World Heritage Convention; the Con-
vention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora; the
1983 International Tropical Timber Agreement; the London Convention of 1972; and
the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer).
8. See Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 25 (Leo Gross ed., 1969).
9. J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATION-
AL LAW OF PEACE 1 (1963).
1557
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1555
sharp line between international and domestic law, and be-
tween public and private international law. Change took place
slowly. But the international legal system that has been emerg-
ing for the new millennium is markedly different."0 While
states continue as important actors, many other actors contrib-
ute to developing, interpreting, implementing, and complying
with international law. This applies to all areas of international
law, not only environmental law. The system is non-hierarchical
in that there are transnational networks of actors, including
states that interact with each other. The sharp lines between
public and private international law have blurred. The divide
between international and domestic international law is fading,
and the preference for binding instruments over voluntary or
legally nonbinding norms is receding. The system is changing
rapidly. Major developments such as private sector environmen-
tal codes and ISO 14000 standards have emerged since 1992."
II. UNDERSTANDING COMPLIANCE
The traditional framework for understanding compliance is
stylized, hierarchical, and static. It assumes that states accept
international agreements only when their governments regard
them to be in their interest. Because of this, states generally
comply with their obligations. If they do not, dispute resolution
is available and sanctions will be used to deter violations and
to punish offenders."
10. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Changing Structure of International Law, in LES
HOMMES ET L'ENVIRONNEMENT 3 (Michel Prier & Claude Lambrechts eds., 1998);
Edith Brown Weiss, The Changing Structure of International Law, 45 GEO. L. 54
(1997) (adapted from a lecture delivered by the author upon receiving the award of
the Francis Cabell Brown Professor of International Law Chair).
11. Trade associations, such as the Chemical Manufacturers Association, have
developed environmental codes to guide members' management practices. For a dis-
cussion, see Michael S. Baram, Multinational Corporations, Private Codes, and Tech-
nology Transfer for Sustainable Development, 24 ENvTL. L. 33 (1994). In addition to
industry specific codes, a series of voluntary standards for environmental management
systems has been promulgated by the International Standards Organization. See, e.g.,
TOM TIBOR & IRA FELDMAN, ISO 14000: A GUIDE TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL MAN-
AGEMENTS STANDARDS (1996).
12. See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Strengthening Compliance with
International Environmental Accords: Preliminary Observations from a Collaborative
Project, 1 GLOBAL GOvERNANCE 119, 122 (1995).
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The reality of compliance differs markedly. States join agree-
ments out of self interest for many reasons. These reasons
affect their intention and capacity to comply. States may join to
exercise leadership in addressing a problem. They may join
because others are doing so, because states with leverage over
them are pressing them to do join, or because other states offer
blandishments to induce them. Sometimes states join because
the agreements do not require changes in their present actions,
or they may join with no intention of complying or lacking the
capacity to comply.
The traditional view assumes that national governments
negotiate international agreements, which are made effective
through implementing legislation or regulations nationally, and
if necessary, locally. This view is hierarchical because it moves
from the international agreement to national regulations to
local regulations and does not account for the nongovernmental
actors, industry associations, and individuals that operate
across national lines and among different levels of government.
This approach is also static because it assumes that a snapshot
at a given point in time accurately captures compliance with
the agreement.
A realistic framework for understanding compliance is non-
hierarchical, includes many actors other than states, and re-
gards compliance as a process that changes over time. Interna-
tional agreements evolve over time, as do the national imple-
menting measures. States are the primary actors, but other
actors are also essential, including intergovernmental organiza-
tions, secretariats to the agreements, nongovernmental organi-
zations, private industrial and commercial organizations, and
individuals. All of these actors interact dynamically in complex
ways that change over time and that vary among agreements
and within countries.
III. THE BAKER'S DOZEN MYTHS ABouT COMPLIANCE
Conventional wisdom, at least among legal scholars, has been
that most countries comply with most international law most of
the time, 3 although to be sure, those in the Realist School
13. See, e.g., LOUIS HENK=, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN PoLICY 47-
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question the relevance of international law at all.'4 The con-
ventional wisdom comprises thirteen assumptions, which upon
closer examination, turn out either to be myths or to apply only
in certain carefully prescribed conditions. These assumptions
are labeled the Baker's Dozen Myths. They reflect the empirical
evidence from the study of five agreements and eight countries
plus the European Union referenced earlier, 5 as well as other
learning in international environmental law and more generally
in public international law.
Myth Number One: All countries comply fully with their inter-
national commitments, or, countries never comply with their in-
ternational commitments.
This myth assumes that countries comply fully, or at least
substantially, with the international agreements they join. They
would not join the agreements were it otherwise. But the reali-
ty is that no country complies fully with all its international
legal obligations. At best, countries substantially comply with
their international commitments. 6 They may comply fully with
certain obligations in a treaty, such as reporting on activities
by a certain date or reducing emissions of ozone depleting sub-
stances by a given date, but they may not comply fully with
other obligations, such as providing financial assistance in the
amount agreed upon or on a timely basis. Certain developing
countries may not comply with a particular agreement because
the relevant ministry may not even be aware that the country
is a party to the agreement. Moreover, a country may lack the
capacity to comply with particular provisions, even if it wants
to do so.'7
50 (2d ed. 1979); see also Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions, in THE IM-
PLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 659, 661 (David G. Victor et al., eds., 1998) (arguing that the
studies on international environmental law in the book confirm that almost all coun-
tries comply with almost all their binding international commitments all the time).
14. See, e.g., HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (6th ed. 1985); Hedley
Bull, Order in the Contemporary International System, in THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY
22 (2d ed. 1977).
15. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
16. See generally ANTONIA H. CHAYES & ABRAM CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); Harold K Jacob-
son & Edith Brown Weiss, Assessing the Record and Designing Strategies to Engage
Countries, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 5, at 511.
17. Capacity to comply with international obligations depends on available fund-
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The parallel myth to full compliance is that states do not
comply at all with their international obligations. Because there
is no international court or international police to enforce inter-
national obligations, people should not expect states to comply.
However, empirical evidence refutes this myth. The interna-
tional empirical study of national compliance found that for the
eight countries and the European Union, each country had tak-
en some steps toward compliance with each of the five agree-
ments, although the extent of compliance varied significantly
among countries and among the agreements for the same coun-
try." Moreover, the study indicated that there is a general
trend toward increased compliance by states the longer the
agreement is in effect.
This should not be surprising, for many rules that affect
people's daily lives are complied with locally even when there is
no realistic expectation that police enforcement or court action
will result from a violation. Consider the individual who ap-
proaches a red light or a stop sign late at night and sees no car
coming in any direction. Some people will nonetheless stop at
the intersection before proceeding. Many reasons may press for
compliance: the desire for similar actions by others; the need
for predictable behavior at stop signs or red lights no matter
what the hour; the fear that there may be a car that cannot be
seen; or of course, the fear that police may be monitoring the
intersection.
The myth that states fully comply with international agree-
ments may have its root in the analogy to compliance in domes-
tic law. People assume that citizens and most private actors
such as companies, banks, corporations, and nongovernmental
organizations generally comply with domestic law. If they do
not, courts are available to enforce compliance with the law.
But the reality is that citizens and other private actors do not
necessarily comply fully with national, state (province), or local
ing, staff, training, and other administrative necessities. See Jacobson & Brown
Weiss, supra note 16, at 531. For example, Cameroon was found to have significant
problems complying with its obligations despite its demonstrated willingness to take
measures. See id. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Implementation, Enforcement
and Compliance With International Environmental Agreements-Practical Suggestions
in Light of the World Bank's Experience, 9 GEO. IN'L ENVTL. L. REV. 37 (1996).
18. See generally Jacobson & Brown Weiss, supra note 16.
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laws. Studies of national compliance with environmental laws
in the United States and in the United Kingdom indicate that
compliance is often less than desired, indeed, compliance is
even weak. 9 By analogy, states can be expected to have prob-
lems in fully complying with their international commitments,
most of which rely on domestic legislation and regulations to
make them enforceable within countries.
Myth Number Two: Implementation, compliance, enforcement,
and effectiveness are interchangeable terms that have the same
meaning.
The terms implementation, compliance, enforcement, and
effectiveness are frequently used interchangeably in discourse.
It is assumed that they refer to similar behavior or produce
similar effects. For example, one may speak of complying with
an international agreement and mean both that the agreement
is enforced and that the agreement is effective.
In reality the terms incorporate different concepts and have
different meanings.' ° "Implementation" of international agree-
ments refers to the actions taken to give effect to the domestic
obligations of the agreement: the adoption of legislation or regu-
lations, judicial decrees, or other actions. Most treaties, particu-
larly in the environmental field, are not self-implementing
agreements, and require domestic legislation or executive regu-
lations to become effective law domestically.
International legal studies have sometimes tried to assess
enforcement of international agreements solely by (1) focusing
on whether domestic implementing legislation or regulations are
in place, and (2) scrutinizing whether these domestic measures
conform to the obligatory language in the agreement."
19. See, e.g., KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT 105-128 (1984);
CLIFFORD RUSSELL, ET AL., ENFORCING POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1986); DAVID
VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN
AND THE UNITED STATES 146-159 (1986).
20. See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, Compliance With International
Environmental Accords: Achievements and Strategies, in INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 78, 82-84 (Mats Rolkn et al. eds., 1997) (explaining the
differences between implementation, compliance, and effectiveness).
21. See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S.
243 [hereinafter CITES]; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
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The concept of compliance includes implementation but is
generally broader. Compliance focuses not only on whether
implementing measures are in effect, but also on whether there
is compliance with the implementing actions. Compliance also
measures the degree to which the actors whose behavior is
targeted by the agreement, whether they be local governmental
units, corporations, organizations, or individuals, conform to the
implementing measures and obligations. The concept is much
broader than solely that of enforcement, because it draws atten-
tion to ways of bringing countries into compliance with their
obligations, not just on how to handle violations after they
occur. In this sense, compliance strategies are intended to pre-
vent noncompliance and address specific instances of noncompli-
ance.
In evaluating compliance, it is useful to distinguish between
procedural compliance, substantive compliance, and compliance
with the spirit of the agreement.' Procedural compliance re-
fers to whether states have filed reports, established particular
governmental authorities, or otherwise followed the procedural
obligations in the agreement. Substantive compliance refers to
compliance with obligations such as those contained in targets
and timetables for limiting emissions of particular pollutants,
obligations to conserve particular sites, and obligations to pro-
vide technical and financial assistance. A country may be in
compliance with its procedural obligations but not with its
substantive obligations or vice versa. Countries may comply
with substantive obligations because the required actions were
in place before they even entered into the agreement, they may
not take the necessary additional steps to comply with proce-
dural duties, such as filing timely annual reports on perfor-
mance under the international agreement.
Countries may be in compliance with the specific obligations
in the agreement but not with the spirit of the agreement. For
example, the former Soviet Union's military dumping of high-
level radioactive waste into the oceans technically may not have
Wild Fauna and Flora, Decisions of the Ninth Meeting of the Conference of Parties,
(last modified Dec. 12, 1997) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/edecis9.htm>
(discussing the implementation of CITES through national legislation and commission-
ing a study on the effectiveness of CITES).
22. See Jacobson & Brown Weiss, supra note 20, at 83.
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violated the provision of the London Convention of 197223 on
marine dumping, but it violated the spirit of the agreement.'
If an industrialized country significantly increases emission of
greenhouse gases after becoming a party to the Kyoto Protocol
but before the stated period for achieving the targeted reduc-
tions, it may not have technically violated the Protocol, but it
would arguably have violated its spirit.25
"Enforcement" refers to the actions taken once violations oc-
cur. It is customarily associated with the availability of formal
dispute settlement procedures and with penalties, sanctions, or
other coercive measures to induce compliance with obligations.
Enforcement is part of the compliance process.
"Effectiveness" refers to whether the purposes of the agree-
ment are being achieved, and more generally, whether the
agreement as designed is effective in addressing the problem for
which it was negotiated. Effectiveness is not necessarily corre-
lated with compliance.
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Spe-
cies of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) may be evaluated as to
whether it is effective in controlling international trade in en-
23. International Maritime Organization Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403,
1046 U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter London Convention of 1972].
24. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 5, at 125-35 (discussing the evolution of the London
Convention of 1972); William Zimmerman et al., The Soviet Union and the Russian
Federation: A Natural Experiment in Environmental Compliance, in ENGAGING COUN-
TRIES, supra note 5, at 313-18 (discussing the Soviet Union and Russian record of
compliance with the London Convention of 1972). The London Convention of 1972
contains the following provision:
This Convention shall not apply to those vessels and aircraft entitled to
sovereign immunity under international law. However, each Party shall
ensure by the adoption of appropriate measures that such vessels and
aircraft owned or operated by it act in a manner consistent with the
object and purpose of this Convention, and shall inform the Organization
accordingly.
London Convention of 1972, supra note 23, 26 U.S.T. at 2410, 1046 U.N.T.S. at 142.
The first sentence of this provision allows for technical exceptions while the second
sentence seeks compliance with the spirit of the Convention.
25. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, adopted Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter
Kyoto Protocol]. For analysis of the Protocol, see Clare Breidenich et al., The Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 315 (1998).
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dangered species.26 This evaluation involves asking whether
those who export and import endangered species obtain the re-
quired permits, whether the permits provide the required infor-
mation and are free from fraud, whether parties have designat-
ed scientific authorities to manage international trade, whether
parties file timely and complete reports of their trade to facili-
tate monitoring, and related questions." The CITES has been
criticized for its effectiveness in controlling international trade
in endangered species.2"
A second level of query addresses whether the CITES, even if
fully complied with, is effective in conserving biological diversi-
ty, which is the underlying purpose of the agreement. This
inquiry evaluates the effectiveness of controlling international
trade in identified species as a measure to protect the species.
Under the CITES, for example, a species can be consumed
domestically and even eliminated domestically without violating
the agreement. This has led some critics to focus on the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity29 and agreements that conserve
habitats as potentially more effective instruments for conserving
species diversity. °
While compliance is presumed to promote effectiveness and
empirical data suggests this linkage, the two can also be de-
linked. For example, a country could limit the destruction of
endangered plant species by land use controls and provide in-
ducements to its people to protect the species by developing
tourism or marketable products from the species, but not be in
compliance with the CITES controlling trade across national
borders. As noted above, the converse can also exist: a country
could be in compliance with trade controls under the CITES but
26. See CITES, supra note 21, 27 U.S.T. at 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. at 243; Brown
Weiss, supra note 24, at 105-16 (discussing the evolution of CITES).
27. See generally ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 5.
28. See, e.g., Patricia Birnie, The Case of the Convention on Trade in Endangered
Species, in ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE
MEANS 233, 260-64 (Rdidiger Wolfrum ed., 1996); Michael J. Glennon, Has Interna-
tional Law Failed the Elephant?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990) (analyzing the effective-
ness of CITES in providing international legal protection for the elephant).
29. Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
30. See, e.g., Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, July 9, 1985, reprinted in 15 J.
ENVTL. POLY & L. 64 (1985). See generally BASIC VOLTME, supra note 2 (regional
agreements addressing habitat preservation).
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promote the elimination of the species by actions within the
country.
Myth Number Three: Binding agreements are always prefera-
ble to nonbinding ones because countries comply with binding
agreements better than they comply with nonbinding agreements.
In international law texts, binding international agreements
are treated as the primary source of international law.31 In-
deed, the International Court of Justice statute lists interna-
tional agreements as the first source of international law. 2
Nonbinding legal instruments have usually either been ignored
as sources of law or treated as a subsidiary source that may
contribute to the emergence of binding legal instruments. The
assumption is that countries comply with binding agreements,
and not with "voluntary" instruments sometimes referred to as
"soft law";3 thus binding agreements are preferable. This issue
emerged in many negotiations during the 1990s, including those
for agreements on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks,' for limiting greenhouse gas emissions,35 and for
forest conservation." In the first two cases, binding agree-
31. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 51-148 (3rd ed. 1993);
BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-63 (2d ed. 1995).
32. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055.
33. The term "soft law" has been widely used by European legal scholars. See,
e.g., Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12
MICH. J. INT'L L. 420 (1991); K.C. Wellens & G.M. Borchardt, Soft Law in European
Community Law, 14 EUR. L. REV. 267 (1989).
34. See Agreement For the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conser-
vation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
adopted Aug. 4, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542. For an analysis of the Agreement, see Christo-
pher J. Carr, Recent Developments in Compliance and Enforcement for International
Fisheries, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 847 (1997); David Freestone & Zen Majuch, The New
International Environmental Law of Fisheries: The 1995 United Nations, Straddling
Stocks Agreement, 5 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 3 (1996).
35. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 25, 37 I.L.M. at 22.
36. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Statement
of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustain-
able Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.1516
Rev. 1, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 881 [hereinafter Forest Principles]. For an analysis of
the Forest Principles, see Richard G. Tarasofsky, The Global Regime for the Conserva-
tion and Sustainable Use of Forest, 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT (Za6RV) 668 (1996).
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ments have emerged; in the last, countries have opted thus far
for nonbinding measures.
Nonbinding instruments are now prominent in many fields of
international law such as those addressing the environment,
human rights," labor," finance, and to a lesser extent, arms
control and trade. The United Nations Environment Progamme
(UNEP) London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on
Chemicals in International Trade,39 the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) International Code of
Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides (the Pesti-
cides Code),' or the many guidelines, principles and recom-
mended practices of UNEP or the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) are important or
nonbinding or incompletely binding sources of law.
Nonbinding legal instruments set forth norms that states and
other actors may observe even though they are not strictly
required to do so. They create expectations that may shape
behavior and avoid disputes. Soft law takes many forms such
as declarations, charters, guidelines, resolutions, codes of con-
duct, and decisions of international bodies (both general and
37. For example, nonbinding international human rights agreements have served
as a basis for later binding agreements. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights,
Dec. 10, 1948, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360.
For a discussion of nonbinding human rights law, see Dinah Shelton, Compliance
with International Human Rights Soft Law, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH
NONBINDING ACCORDS 119 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997).
38. The International Labor Organization, the European Union, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and private companies have
adopted a number of important nonbinding labor agreements. The International Labor
Organization, in particular, has an elaborate system of nonbinding agreements includ-
ing Formal Declarations of Principles, Recommendations, and Codes of Practice and
Guidelines. See, e.g., Virginia Leary, Nonbinding Accords in the Field of Labor, in
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 247 (Edith Brown Weiss ed.,
1997).
39. London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in Interna-
tional Trade, May 25, 1989, U.N. Doc. UNEP/PIC.WG.24 (1989), reprinted in BASIC
VOLUME, supra note 2, at 644 [hereinafter London Guidelines].
40. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Code
of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides (last modified Apr. 23, 1998)
<http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpp/pesticid/code/Annex.htm> [hereinafter Pesticides Code].
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specific). The term "soft law" is also used to refer to provisions
in binding agreements that are hortatory rather than obligato-
ry 41
States negotiate soft law instruments for many reasons. Of-
ten, they are a first step towards the negotiation of binding
agreements. For example, the London Guidelines and the Pesti-
cides Code led to the successful negotiation of a binding agree-
ment on prior informed consent to address the same issues as
the nonbinding instruments.42  The Convention for the
Application of Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade
(PIC Convention) reflects experience with the voluntary require-
ments.43 In other cases, the soft law instrument is a means of
gathering consensus on an issue before embarking on formal
treaty negotiations. For example, the United Nations Resolution
on the seabed as the "Common Heritage of Mankind" was
adopted before the Law of the Sea negotiations began.'
Nonbinding instruments provide flexibility to adapt to chang-
ing conditions. States may prefer nonbinding instruments be-
cause they do not have to ensure that domestic legislation fully
complies, particularly where necessary legislative changes might
not pass Congress or Parliament. In some cases, states may be
reluctant to commit the resources needed to implement a bind-
ing agreement. Soft law is particularly useful when it is diffi-
cult to reach an agreement on precise, binding legal obligations.
Agreement on a soft law instrument is usually easier to
achieve, the transaction costs are lower, and the opportunity to
set forth detailed strategies that can be altered easily is great-
er. Particularly with the rise of new environmental problems,
41. See Paul C. Szasz, International Norm-Making, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAw 41, 70 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1993).
42. See Convention For the Application of Prior Informed Consent Procedure For
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sep. 11, 1998,
reprinted in 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2 [hereinafter PIC Convention]. For an
analysis of the PIC Convention, see Peter Lallas & Steve Wolfson, International Coop-
eration to Address Risks from Pesticides and Hazardous Chemicals (1997), reprinted in
EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLIcY 803
(1998).
43. See PIC Convention, supra note 42.
44. See Declaration of the Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, and
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
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many of which involve thousands of actors globally, soft law
instruments that send important signals about how countries
are expected to behave will continue to be useful.45
There is a disciplinary difference about assumptions regard-
ing compliance with nonbinding instruments. Lawyers generally
assume that compliance will be better with a binding instru-
ment, while political scientists are not convinced that the bind-
ing nature of the obligation necessarily affects whether coun-
tries comply with it.46 The binding nature of the obligation,
however, may reflect other factors so that the patterns of com-
pliance with binding and nonbinding instruments may differ.4
Lawyers frequently point to the remedies available to enforce
binding agreements, such as judicial and other methods of adju-
dication, as an important distinguishing characteristic of bind-
ing agreements that affects compliance. But, there are other
strategies available to encourage compliance that could apply to
binding as well as nonbinding instruments. These strategies
include various financial, diplomatic, and other incentives or
blandishments, as well as coercive measures. Moreover, the
institutional structure available to assist countries and nongov-
ernmental actors in monitoring compliance may be as important
as whether the instruments are binding. For example, the suc-
cess in securing compliance with the human rights provisions of
the nonbinding Helsinki Final Act was due in good part to the
lengthy review conference among Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) members. The members exam-
ined compliance with the provisions in detail and evaluated the
pressures exerted by governments and by nongovernmental
organizations." Binding agreements, however, may provide for
45. For a discussion of the value of soft law instruments, see Edith Brown Weiss,
Introduction, in INTERNATIONAL CONPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS, supra note
37, at 1.
46. See, e.g., Peter M. Haas, Why Comply, or Some Hypotheses in Search of An
Analyst, in INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 21, 23 (Edith
Brown Weiss ed., 1997).
47. See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45
INT'L ORG. 495 (1991).
48. See Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; Thomas Buergenthal, The Helsinki Process: Birth of a
Human Rights System, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 256, 256-57,
266-68 (R. Claude & B. Weston eds., 1992).
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formal dispute settlement and may require the parties to en-
gage in other procedures intended to enhance accountability.
This, in turn, may increase compliance.
The research on domestic compliance with informal social
norms and with private agreements is relevant. In Order With-
out Law,49 Robert Ellickson details how cattle ranchers devel-
oped and enforced norms of behavior among themselves without
relying upon the state.50 In contract law, scholars in the law
and society movement in the United States note that the rela-
tional setting and the desire to maintain an ongoing relation-
ship are more conducive to securing compliance than the exis-
tence of contract law.5 The research on informal social norms
and on contract law suggests that under some circumstances
nonbinding instruments may be complied with as well as bind-
ing ones. Judicial remedies associated with binding agreements
sometimes may be marginal to compliance, at least for some
agreements and some countries.
Myth Number Four: Secretariats for international agreements
are like puppets on strings that governments control. They have
little influence; their activities are minimal.
After treaties are concluded, secretariats usually need to be
designated to handle administrative arrangements related to
treaty implementation. Sometimes a unit in an existing interna-
tional institution is designated. For example, officials in the
International Maritime Organization serve as the secretariat for
the London Convention of 1972.52 Until 1992, officials in the
United Nations Educational Scientific, and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) served as the secretariat for the World Heritage
Centre; there was no separate secretariat unit.53 For most in-
ternational environmental agreements, separate secretariats are
49. ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
50. See id. at 1-4.
51. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelim-
inary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What
We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIs. L. REv. 483 (1985).
52. See London Convention of 1972, supra note 23; Brown Weiss, supra note 24,
at 130.
53. See Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 11 I.L.M. 1358 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention];
Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 101.
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established to help administer the treaty. Many of these sepa-
rate secretariats are under the auspices of UNEP and are rela-
tively small organizations. Secretariats range in size from those
having several personnel to those having a staff of about twen-
ty. Their budgets range from less than a million U.S. dollars to
three million U.S. dollars, the latter figure representing the
1996 annual budget of the International Tropical Timber Agree-
ment secretariat in Yokohama, Japan.'
The perception is that governments control the secretariats
and keep them on a tight leash, and that secretariats thus
have little independent influence in shaping the development
and implementation of the treaty. The size of most secretariats
and their resources reinforces this perception. Government
secondment of personnel to secretariats also reinforces the im-
pression of governmental control. In international law, the sec-
retariats are responsible to the parties for the administration of
the agreement. The meetings of the parties and subcommittee
meetings govern the secretariats' activities.
The reality, however, is that secretariats can be influential
bodies in treaty management. They carry on a wide range of
activities and maintain contacts with all the actors in the inter-
national system including party states, non-party states, non-
governmental organizations, industry, individuals, and other
international organizations. Secretariat personnel are often the
only officials with a broad overview of states' implementation or
violation of the agreement. They serve as the modal point for
interactions with the other actors in the international system.
Sometimes they advise governments on compliance, as in the
responses of the CITES secretariat to queries concerning the
legitimacy of export or import permits.55 At other times, they
may advise private parties on compliance, as in the Montreal
Protocol.5" They may develop proposals for methods to encour-
age compliance that are then introduced by states, or states
may funnel their ideas through the secretariats for exploration
with other parties.
54. See International Tropical Timber Agreement, Nov. 18, 1983, reprinted in
BASIC VOLUME, supra note 2, at 508; see Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 122.
55. See Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 109-10.
56. See id. at 148.
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Secretariats have been quite effective at trying to jawbone
parties into compliance with some agreements. They investigate
instances of noncompliance, conduct on-site monitoring mis-
sions, review reports filed by parties, conduct technical training
programs that assist governments and nongovernmental actors
in attaining compliance, and otherwise build local capacity to
comply. Over time, the secretariats for the five agreements
studied in Engaging Countries increased the time and funding
spent on monitoring, technical assistance and training, and on
other compliance related activities.57
To be sure, the power of the secretariats can be constrained.
In many cases, their funding comes directly from the parties.
The parties retain the power to revoke authority that the sec-
retariats assumed de facto. But for most agreements, strong,
effective secretariats have been important in advancing the
provisions of the agreements. One notable exception, thus far, is
the Alpine Convention, in which the parties have yet to estab-
lish a secretariat."
Myth Number Five: The more precise the obligation, the better
the compliance by parties.
In international negotiations, countries frequently have
pressed for precisely defined obligations, in part, because it is
assumed that countries will be forced to comply better with
precise commitments than with vague ones. The reality is that
if the obligations are precisely stated, it is much easier to de-
termine whether states have complied with them. It does not
necessarily follow that states will comply with precise obliga-
tions better than with those that are more generally stated.
The Montreal Protocol provides precise targets and timetables
for phasing out specific chemicals that deplete the ozone lay-
er. 9 Countries must provide annual reports indicating their
consumption and production of the controlled chemicals." By
57. See id. at 168-71.
58. See Convention on the Protection of the Alps, Nov. 7, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 767.
For an analysis of the Convention, see Wolfgang Burhenne, The Alpine Conven-
tion-An Update, 27 ENvTL. PoLy & L. 407 (1997).
59. See Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
60. See id. at 1556.
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reviewing the reports and considering other available informa-
tion from both governments and the private sector, it is possi-
ble to determine whether parties are complying with their obli-
gations under the Protocol. If the obligations were more gener-
al, assessing compliance would be more difficult and the obliga-
tions would surely not be as effective. In this sense, the myth
is a correct statement.
For some obligations, however, it is not appropriate to be
precise. For example, the World Heritage Convention provides
that each state party "undertakes not to take any deliberate
measures which might damage directly or indirectly the cultur-
al and natural heritage.., situated on the territory of other
States Parties to the Convention."6' In article 4, the Conven-
tion recognizes that each state party has the primary "duty of
ensuring the identification, protection, conservation, presenta-
tion and transmission to future generations of the cultural and
natural heritage ... situated on its territory." 2 While the
Convention sets forth several categories of activities in which
parties should engage, it never mandates precise targets and
timetables or comparable provisions. These would not be appro-
priate. Compliance with the more generally stated obligations
does not necessarily suffer because of the wording. Research
into compliance with the Convention indicates that some coun-
tries have substantially, if not fully, complied with the agree-
ment.63
Myth Number Six: Regular country reports are critical for
monitoring compliance. Full compliance by all states party to
the agreement is essential.
Monitoring is essential for increasing compliance with inter-
national agreements. It may take many forms such as reports
by governments and/or nongovernmental organizations and in-
dustries; on-site monitoring by parties, secretariats or consul-
tants; off-site monitoring through advanced technologies; or
review of materials submitted by parties or by other sources.
Many international environmental agreements provide for moni-
61. World Heritage Convention, supra note 53, 27 U.S.T. at 42, 11 I.L.M. at 1360.
62. Id. 27 U.S.T. at 41, 11 I.L.M., at 1359.
63. See Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 93-105; Jacobson & Brown Weiss, supra
note 16, at 519.
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toring through regular national reports that countries file with
the treaty secretariat. In the 1990s, it has become customary to
include a reporting requirement in nearly all new international
environmental agreements.
National reporting is useful because it engages countries in
implementing the agreement. One or more officials within the
national government must become involved in compiling the
information for the report. Reporting is useful as a tool for
educating governments and other actors concerning the actions
necessary to comply with international obligations. The process
of preparing the reports may build local capacity to comply with
the substantive obligations in the treaty.
But reporting is seen primarily by states as a critical moni-
toring tool. This use raises important problems that need to be
addressed. Foremost is the problem that countries may be un-
willing to report their own shortcomings.' For example, the
brief efforts by the World Heritage Convention parties in the
1980s to obtain national reports failed for this reason."5 The
reports were uneven, and at least one country applying for
assistance to preserve an endangered site reportedly filed a
report indicating successful conservation of its sites.6 Reports
submitted for other international agreements have sometimes
been incomplete, inaccurate, or late. 7 Some national reports
filed under the Montreal Protocol, for example, have been late
or inaccurate, although reporting has been generally better than
for other agreements." This suggests that independent review
of the reports by the secretariat and parties is essential for the
reports to have value as monitors of national compliance. De-
pending upon the issue area, on-site monitoring or off-site mon-
itoring with advanced technologies may be essential for uncov-
ering unstated compliance problems.
64. See, e.g., Kamen Sachariew, Promoting Compliance with International Environ-
mental Legal Standards: Reflections on Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms, 2 Y.B.
INT'L & ENVTL. L. 31 (1991) (doubting the effectiveness of self-reporting because of
the inherent element of self-assessment).
65. See Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 104.
66. See id.
67. See Michael Bothe, The Evaluation of Enforcement Mechanisms in Internation-
al Environmental Law, in ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHA-
NISMS AS VIABLE MEANS? 13, 24 (Ruidiger Wolfrum ed., 1996).
68. See Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 152-53.
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National reports as a monitoring tool also suffer from the
problem of "report congestion." National officials who must file
regular reports under the growing number of international
environmental agreements may find that their time is largely
spent preparing reports rather than taking the actions called
for in the agreements or in addressing other environmental
concerns.69 Particularly in countries with scarce professional
staff, the national government may need to devote much of its
time to complying with reporting requirements.
A problem of "reporting congestion" also appears at the inter-
national level." Different secretariats receive separate national
reports for each of the agreements. Information required by one
treaty may overlap with that required by another. Unless there
are standardized protocols for reporting, the data may be diffi-
cult to compare and evaluate. Moreover, inconsistencies in in-
formation from the same country for different agreements may
exist, and the content of reports from different countries may
vary significantly. Secretariats, parties, or designated nongov-
ernmental bodies may need to devote considerable time to re-
viewing and verifying the national reports."
For national reports to be effective in monitoring compliance,
it has been assumed that all countries must comply with the
reporting requirement. Empirical research, however, indicates
that this is not essential. Rather, the states who are major
actors in a specific agreement must comply and file timely and
complete reports. 2 This is perhaps best illustrated by report-
ing under the London Convention of 1972, where it is more
important that the member states who are major contributors
to marine pollution report than that all states, some of whom
have little marine activity, report. Thus, the relevant question
is: what percentage of the major polluting states comply with
the reporting requirement? Focusing on the total percentage of
parties complying with the annual reporting requirement may
be misleading. In agreements such as the World Heritage Con-
vention, however, it is arguably important that all countries
69. See Bothe, supra note 67, at 23.
70. See Jacobson & Brown Weiss, supra note 16, at 545.
71. See id.
72. See id.
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report because the Convention focuses on the national sites on
the World Heritage List; every country is in this sense a major
player. Moreover, compliance by all states with reporting obliga-
tions may be important to building the long-term capacity of
states to comply with the agreement and to forging a culture of
compliance among the parties to the agreement. 3
Myth Number Seven: Decentralizing implementation of the
agreement and making local communities responsible improves
compliance.
National governments enter into international agreements
with other countries, but the authority of national governments
may not reach effectively into local areas. While local communi-
ties may be essential to implementing the agreement, they may
be unaware of the international commitments or have no inter-
est in complying with them. This is sometimes described as a
core-periphery problem, in which the core government has diffi-
culty ensuring compliance by actors who are geographically on
the periphery.74
Evidence for this abounds. The national government in India
cannot effectively control events in Manas National Park in
order to protect the park and be in compliance with the World
Heritage Convention.75 Brazil has found it difficult to control
trade in endangered species across its borders in the Amazon
region or to ensure sustainable management of its forests.7"
China's national government in Beijing has had difficulty con-
73. See id.
74. See, e.g., ASIT K. BAsISWAS, ET AL., CORE AND PERIPHERY: A COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH TO MIDDLE EASTERN WATER (1997) (applying the core-periphery in context
of water resource management); DONALD E. JORDAN, JR., LAND AND POPULAR POLITICS
IN IRELAND (1994) (developing a core-periphery analysis of the social, political, and
economic development of County Mayo in Ireland); Michael Hechter, INTERNAL COLO-
NIALISM: THE CELTIC FRINGE IN BRITISH NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1536-1966 (1975);
G. William Skinner, Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China, in THE CITY
IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 211 (G. William Skinner, ed. 1977); G. William Skinner,
Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems, in THE CITY IN LAKE IMPERIAL CHINA 275
(G. William Skinner ed., 1977).
75. See Ronald J. Herring & Erach Bharucha, Embedded Capacities: India's Com-
pliance with International Environmental Accords, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra
note 5, at 405-08.
76. See Murillo de Aragao & Stephen Bunker, Brazil: Regional Inequalities and
Ecological Diversity in a Federal System, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 5, at
489-500.
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trolling activities in southern and western China to ensure
compliance with several international environmental agree-
ments.7
Federalism contributes to compliance difficulties. Countries
such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, India, and
the United States have several levels of political authority.
When the activities that are the subject of the agreement are
widely dispersed, such as world heritage sites, trade across
borders, and sustainable management of forests, the various
levels of authority may not coordinate their activities or work
together to effect treaty compliance.
These considerations might be thought to lead to the conclu-
sion that decentralizing implementation of the agreement and
involving local communities will improve a country's compliance
with their international commitments. Engaging local people
will create a culture of compliance with the agreement.7" How-
ever, decentralization does not always promote compliance, at
least in the near term. As part of its political reform, for exam-
ple, the Russian Federation decentralized authority so that
control over local communities weakened. This led, at least in
the short term, to significantly lower compliance by the Russian
Federation with the CITES.7' Indeed in all countries, local
communities and their officials may have priorities other than
those of the national government. They may lack the resources
and the administrative or other capacity to comply with the
international commitments. Local officials may be more likely to
engage in rent-seeking behavior."0
77. See Michael Oksenberg & Elizabeth Economy, China: Implementation Under
Economic Growth and Market Reform, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra note 5, at 353-
94.
78. In some cases, local efforts are more successful than national efforts at im-
plementation. See, e.g., Kyle W. Danish, International Environmental Law and the
"Bottom-Up" Approach: A Review of the Desertification Convention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 133 (1995) (arguing that the "bottom-up" approach of the Convention to
Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Drought and/or
Desertification, particularly in Africa, will be more successful than the "top-down" ap-
proach of the failed 1977 United Nations Conference on Desertification).
79. See William Zimmerman et. al., The Soviet Union and the Russian Federation:
A Natural Experiment in Environmental Compliance, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES, supra
note 5, at 319.
80. In southern Africa, for example, game wardens have an incentive to partici-
pate in the tusk market. Whereas the salary for a warden is very low, the profits
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Over time, engaging local communities should, in principle,
lead to greater compliance. They should become part of a cul-
ture of compliance with the agreement. But this likely means
educating the communities to their obligations, providing finan-
cial and technical incentives to comply, and building the capaci-
ty of local authorities to comply. Moreover, for obligations that
involve controlling trade across borders, it is important that
countries on both sides of the border be party to the relevant
agreements.
Myth Number Eight. Democracy always promotes compliance.
Democratic countries always comply, better than nondemocratic
countries.
Democratic countries are assumed to do a better job of com-
plying with their international commitments than nondemocrat-
ic countries. Frequently the assumption is rephrased to indicate
that democratic countries with market economies comply better
than other countries. The assumption is that democracy leads
to an informed civil society, which operates under the rule of
law; this in turn provides a hospitable climate for countries to
implement and comply with international legal obligations.
As Engaging Countries notes:
There are many features of democratic governments that
contribute to improved implementation and compliance.
Democratic governments are normally more transparent
than authoritarian governments, so interested citizens can
more easily monitor what their governments are doing to
implement and comply with accords. In democratic govern-
ments it is possible for citizens to bring pressure to bear for
improved implementation and compliance. Also, nongovern-
mental organizations generally have more freedom to oper-
ate under democratic governments. In addition, fully inde-
pendent courts can be used by nongovernmental organiza-
tions and citizens to force governmental action."
from selling contraband tusks are quite high. By selling one tusk, a warden could
feed a family for several months. See Farhana Yamin & Annabella L. Gualdoni, A
Case Study of a Regional Approach to Compliance with CITES in Southern Africa, in
IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 192 (James
Cameron, et al. eds., 1996).
81. Jacobson & Brown Weiss, supra note 16, at 533.
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The country studies in Engaging Countries generally document
this improved implementation and compliance. For example,
better compliance by the Russian Federation with the London
Convention of 1972 on marine dumping than by the former
Soviet Union can be "attributed to the greater transparency in
governmental processes that started with the reforms under
Gorbachev and were continued after the collapse of the Soviet
Union."82
It is not clear, however, that democracy automatically or
necessarily leads to greater compliance with international com-
mitments. While democracy is more responsive to public opin-
ion, the public opinion may not be supportive of the interna-
tional concerns. Also, particular special interest groups may
devote very substantial resources to influencing public opinion
and law-makers to behave in ways that do not promote compli-
ance. The failure of the United States to pay its legally obligat-
ed dues to the United Nations poignantly illustrates this point.
Moreover, nongovernmental organizations interests are not
necessarily consistent with those articulated in the internation-
al agreements.
In a democratic culture, there are more opportunities for
diverse interests to influence behavior, and there is greater
access to information and increased transparency. But, this also
means that governance can become increasingly difficult and
that efforts to ensure compliance with international obligations
may be more complicated.
Myth Number Nine: The influence of nongovernmental organi-
zations always leads to better state compliance.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have played a crucial
role in promoting implementation and compliance with interna-
tional environmental agreementsY Greenpeace, for example,
82. Id.
83. For studies discussing the impact of NGOs on international environmental
law, see CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 16, at 250-70; Steve Charnovitz, Two Centu-
ries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 183
(1997); Kal Raustiala, The "Participatory Revolution" in International Environmental
Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 537 (1997); Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmen-
tal Organizations in the Development of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI.-
KENT L. REv. 61 (1992).
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with more than 4.1 million members has effectively promoted
compliance by member states with the London Convention of
1972 controlling marine dumping." TRAFFIC and the World
Wildlife Fund have helped to promote compliance with the
CITES and with the International Tropical Timber Agreement,
in part by exposing illegal practices.5 The IUCN has moni-
tored World Heritage sites for their conservation status.86
Sometimes the NGOs are international with offices in two or
more countries. Others are national and link across borders
with other NGOs. Still others are local. Some NGOs are orga-
nized around a. cluster of issues; others are issue specific and
may disappear when the issue has been resolved.
NGOs monitor behavior of governments and of private actors,
participate in meetings of the parties for some international
agreements, mobilize political opinion, set political agendas, and
gather and make information available to governments and to
the public.8 7 NGOs may be the vehicle for providing access to
funds in poor countries, which in turn may build local capacity
and promote compliance.
However, NGOs do not uniformly assist compliance with
particular international agreements." Some NGOs are created
to advance interests that run counter to the agreement. Some
may be creatures of a government that has little interest in
compliance. In some cases, as in climate change, there are
NGOs and industrial associations pressing opposing points of
view. 9 Lobbyists may press interests that undermine compli-
84. See Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 130-31; see also Peter J. Spiro, New Glob-
al Communities: Nongovernmental Organizations in International Decision-Making
Institutions, 18 WASH. Q. 45 (1995) (citing membership of Greenpeace).
85. See Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 111, 123.
86. See id. at 102.
87. See Spiro, supra note 84, at 45-46.
88. See THOMAS G. WEISS & LEON GORDENKER, NGOs, THE UN, & GLOBAL GOV-
ERNANCE 219 (1996) (noting that NGO leaders may push their own political agendas
rather than that of constituents).
89. In particular, environmentalists have criticized the Global Climate Coalition
(GCC), an organization of business trade associations and private companies, for at-
tempting to thwart international climate change negotiations. See Summary of Global
Climate Coalition Activities: 1996-1997 (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http'J/www.ozone.org/
pagel6.html> (summarizing 1996-1997 GCC activities from the perspective of a non-
profit environment group, Ozone Action). The GCC sponsors studies and advertising
on the adequacy of scientific evidence for climate change and the economic impact of
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ance. Or NGO activities intended to advance the purposes of an
agreement may have unintended negative effects on compli-
ance.
90
The international community has yet to develop procedures
for holding nongovernmental organizations accountable for their
actions. Frequently, it is difficult to identify the funding sources
for an NGO or to evaluate the information presented (informa-
tion that is often presented as advocacy for particular posi-
tions). The public may find it difficult to evaluate the credibility
of an NGO's position, as may local or national authorities.
Thus, while particular NGOs have been important in promoting
implementation and compliance with specific agreements, other
NGOs could well undermine compliance.
Myth Number Ten: Formal dispute resolution procedures are
essential to achieving compliance with an international environ-
mental agreement.
Many international environmental agreements provide for
formal dispute settlement procedures.91 The assumption is that
when disputes arise over the interpretation of the agreement or
the developing international climate change regime. See id. In 1998, the GCC sup-
ported the House Appropriations Committee's effort to prohibit the use of funds for
considering how to implement the Kyoto Protocol before the Protocol goes to the Sen-
ate for ratification. See Sam Loewnberg, Chill Hits Global Warming Pact, LEGAL
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1998, at 4; Veteran Affairs and HUD Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2496 (1998); Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supple-
mental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 573(a), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
Other industry groups support efforts to address climate change. The Pew Center on
Global Climate Change's Business Environmental Leadership Council, for example,
whose members include major companies such as American Electric Power, Boeing,
Enron, and Lockheed Martin, supports a cost effective and global response to climate
change. See What We Believe (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http://www.pewelimate.org/be-
lieve.html>; Business Council (visited Feb. 18, 1999) <http'//www.pewclimate.org/coun-
cil.html>.
90. See WEISS & GORDENKER, supra note 88, at 217.
91. See, e.g., Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Oct. 4,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 1455; Agreement on Air Quality, Mar. 13, 1991, Can.-U.S., T.I.A.S.
11,783, 30 I.L.M. 676; Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657; Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, T.IA.S. 11,097, 26 I.L.M. 1529;
Treaty Relating to the Boundary Waters and Questions Arising Along the Boundary
Between Canada and the United States, Jan. 11, 1909, U.S.-Great Britain, 36 Stat.
2448 [hereinafter U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters Agreement of 1909]. The dispute set-
tlement procedures of the Vienna Convention also apply to the Montreal Protocol,
supra note 59, art. 14.
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over a violation of its provisions, parties must be able to resort
to formal procedures such as mediation, conciliation, arbitra-
tion, or international adjudication to resolve the dispute. This,
in turn, promotes effective enforcement of the agreement.
The reality is that the parties have never invoked the formal
dispute settlement procedures contained in most international
environmental agreements. The U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters
Agreement of 1909 offers perhaps an exception. While neither
Canada nor the United States have invoked the formal dispute
settlement provisions of Article X that provide for arbitration
and ultimately international judicial resolution,92 they have
invoked Article IX which provides for a Reference." Under this
procedure, the International Joint Commission appoints experts
to form an investigatory body to determine the facts at issue in
the dispute and to issue a report to the parties. On the basis of
the report, the countries are expected, but not required, to take
actions resolving the problem. As of 1997, there had been 52
References.94 The procedure is similar to that of commissions
of inquiry provided for in The Hague Convention for the Pacific
Settlement of Disputes of 1907. 95
Rather than relying on formal dispute settlement, states that
are parties to international environmental agreements have
resolved disputes through meetings of the parties (or meetings
of subcommittees of parties) or by developing procedures for
implementation and noncompliance within the framework of the
agreement. For example, parties to the Montreal Protocol estab-
lished an Implementation Committee and developed noncompli-
ance procedures." While initially parties addressed only issues
92. See U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters Agreement of 1909, supra note 91, 36 Stat.
at 2453.
93. See id.
94. See Edith Brown Weiss, Managing International Water Conflicts: The Great
Lakes (USA-Canada) (Feb. 1997) (report to the Alfred Wedener Institute, Germany,
on file with the author).
95. See Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2199; see also Edith Brown Weiss, New Directions for the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement: A Commentary, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 377-78 (1989) (discussing the
dispute resolution procedure for the U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters Agreement of
1909).
96. See Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Nov. 25, 1992, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, available
in 1987 WL 285879.
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related to noncompliance with procedural requirements such as
annual reporting, they subsequently dealt with important issues
of noncompliance with substantive commitments to reduce and
phase out ozone depleting chemicals. The 1996 Protocol to the
London Convention of 1972 provides for the parties to develop
noncompliance procedures. 7 A 1997 decision of the Executive
Body of the Economic Commission of Europe's 1979 Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution98 sets forth non-
compliance procedures that apply to the more recently conclud-
ed protocols to the convention.9 These procedures enable par-
ties to use a variety of strategies in inducing countries to com-
ply with the agreement's obligations.
In other fields, such as trade law and human rights, settling
disputes has become increasingly judicialized. The World Trade
Organization has established an appellate body to hear disputes
appealed from a panel's decision.0 0 The European Court of
Human Rights has been reorganized as of November 1, 1998, to
provide for panels and the submission of claims of violation
directly to the court rather than through the former European
Commission on Human Rights.'0 ' Yet, curiously in the envi-
ronmental area, there has not been a parallel movement toward
adjudication of disputes. In part, this may be because the envi-
ronment is a commonly shared resource, a situation that en-
courages multi-party consideration of noncompliance. In the
bilateral U.S.-Canada agreement on boundary waters, reference
procedures have been invoked frequently.102 Moreover, when
97. See Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention), Nov. 7, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 7.
98. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979,
T.IA.S. 1054, 18 I.L.M. 1442 [hereinafter LRTAP]; see Decision 1997/2, Concerning
the Implementation Committee, Its Structure and Functions and Procedures for Re-
view of Compliance, reprinted in 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2.
99. See Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollu-
tion on Persistent Organic Pollutants, June 24, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 505; Draft Protocol to
the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Heavy Metals,
June 24, 1998, reprinted in 1999 SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2; Protocol to the 1979
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sul-
phur Emissions, June 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1540; LRTAP, supra note 98.
100. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2: Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1226.
101. See European Court of Human Rights, Rules of Court (last modified Nov. 4,
1998) <http'//www.dhcour.coe.fr/Rules%20of%2OCourt%2Oeng.html>.
102. See U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters Agreement of 1909, supra note 91, and
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noncompliance involves illegal trades across national borders,
national enforcement mechanisms and judicial resolution have
applied, as in violations of the CITES and illegal smuggling of
chlorofluoracarbons (CFCs) into the United States. To the ex-
tent that the international environmental agreements involve
trade-related disputes, countries may resort to formal dispute
resolution procedures.
While it would be easy to infer from the above discussion
that dispute resolution procedures are marginal to compliance
with international environmental agreements, this would be a
premature conclusion. The existence of the procedures may
have the effect of encouraging the parties to resolve their dis-
putes in more flexible ways. While this is difficult to prove, it is
consistent with scholarship about the effect of courts in encour-
aging out-of-court negotiated settlements.
Myth Number Eleven: Coercive measures in cases of noncom-
pliance are essential to securing compliance with international
environmental agreements.
Traditionally, international law relies on coercive measures to
enforce compliance with its mandates. These coercive measures
may be defined as "[alny threatened action or combination of
actions that ... will operate to offset the net benefit that a
potential violator could gain from noncompliance.""3 These
include sanctions (military or economic), penalties, and mea-
sures such as withdrawing membership privileges under the
agreement. The coercive measures are commonly associated
with international rules related to the use of force or to obliga-
tions in trade agreements. By contrast, coercive measures are
rarely used in international environmental law. Some scholars
have suggested that they are mostly irrelevant and ineffective
for addressing international environmental problems." 4
The coercive measures found in international environmental
agreements are of three kinds: those that provide for trade
accompanying text.
103. George W. Downs, Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation, 19 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 319, 321 (1998).
104. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 16, at 29-108; Abram Chayes, Proceedings
of the 91st Annual Meeting: Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness, 1997 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. 53-54.
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sanctions,"5 those that withdraw certain privileges of mem-
bership," 6 and those that provide for publication of infractions
in official publications accessible to the public.0 7 The last may
be more appropriately characterized as a "sunshine" method of
inducing compliance for it relies upon exposure of the infraction
to trigger pressures from other parties, nongovernmental orga-
nizations, and even individuals to comply.
The use of trade sanctions raises the question of consistency
with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT
1994),"'5 which provides for national treatment for imported
and domestic "like" products, prohibits import quotas, and re-
quires most-favored-nation treatment among parties (i.e., the
most favorable treatment offered to one exporting country must
be accorded to all). Critics of trade sanctions could argue that
such sanctions impose import quotas and require countries to
discriminate in their trade on the basis of whether a state is in
compliance with an international agreement, and further, that
105. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora (CITES) provides that parties may "penalize trade in, or possession of,
such specimens, or both" and that parties may adopt stricter domestic measures re-
stricting trade. CITES, supra note 21, 27 U.S.T. at 1101, 993 U.N.T.S. at 250. The
parties to the CITES considered imposing trade sanctions on China and Taiwan in
response to violations of the CITES in connection with their trade in rhinoceros horns
and tiger parts. In response to CITES Standing Committee recommendations, the
United States unilaterally imposed import sanctions against Taiwan, which is not a
party to the agreement, under the Pelly Amendment in 1994. See Christine Crawford,
Conflicts Between the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and
the GATT in Light of Actions to Halt the Rhinoceros and Tiger Trade, 7 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REv. 555 (1995).
106. If developing country parties to the Montreal Protocol have not filed baseline
data reports within one year after approval of their country reports, they will no
longer be eligible for delayed compliance deadlines and special assistance under Arti-
cle V of the Protocol. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 59, 26 I.L.M. at 1555; see
also Brown Weiss, supra note 24, at 150. While the World Heritage Convention pro-
vides only for the listing of sites on the World Heritage List, the Operational Guide-
lines provide that parties may delist a site if a country fails to protect it. See World
Heritage Convention, supra note 53, 27 U.S.T. at 43, 11 I.L.M. at 1359; World Heri-
tage Committee, 20th Sess., Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the
World Heritage Convention (visited Dec. 2, 1998) <http'//www.unesco.org/whc/nwhc/
pages/doc/main.htm>. The World Heritage Committee can revise the Operational
Guidelines at any time.
107. In 1991, parties to the CITES decided that failure to fie annual reports
would be considered an infraction of the agreement. The parties compiled and circu-
lated a list of countries that had committed infractions. See Brown Weiss, supra note
24, at 112.
108. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125.
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the Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions in the GATT 1994 do not
apply. Thus, trade sanctions may be of limited utility as a
means of enforcing international environmental agreements.
While the historical record indicates that states have not
relied upon coercive measures to secure compliance with inter-
national environmental agreements, this does not mean that
such measures are irrelevant. George Downs and other political
scientists have argued that enforcement is relevant to all inter-
national agreements in which a state has an incentive to defect
from the cooperative arrangements in the agreement. 109 The
threat of coercive measures can induce conforming behavior
even though the coercion is never invoked. In Engaging Coun-
tries, coercive measures were retained in the mix of strategies
that should be available to parties to induce countries to com-
ply."0 They are particularly useful for countries whose inten-
tion to comply is weak or who face strong domestic pressures to
lapse into noncompliance.
Myth Number Twelve: Markets create incentives for countries
not to comply with agreements, or, free markets always promote
compliance.
While some would argue that markets hinder compliance and
others would argue that markets are the essential key to secur-
ing compliance, experience indicates that the effect of markets
on compliance is, at any given time, mixed. Markets both help
and hinder compliance, even within the same agreement. On
one hand, for example, the existence of markets for the sub-
stitute chemicals that were developed to replace the chemicals
phased out under the Montreal Protocol has enabled producer
countries to comply with the Protocol. Moreover, the large pro-
ducers of the CFCs and other controlled substances under the
Montreal Protocol have been effective monitors of the behavior
of other companies to ensure that the playing field remains
level among competitors. On the other hand, the continuing
markets for original CFCs has led to extensive cross-border
smuggling and has undercut compliance with the Protocol. In
109. See Downs, supra note 103, at 322; see also George W. Downs et al., Is the
Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379
(1996).
110. See Jacobson & Brown Weiss, supra note 16, at 547.
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response, the parties to the Montreal Protocol adopted an
amendment in 1997 requiring states to establish a national ex-
port and import licensing system for new, used, recycled, and
reclaimed ozone depleting substances subject to control under
the Protocol.
Similarly, under the CITES, the market has both helped and
hindered compliance. A decline in the market demand for an
endangered species in which trade is prohibited helps to enforce
the treaty. Continued demand for a species or its parts, such as
rhinoceros horns, undercuts the treaty.
Because markets can assist or hinder national efforts at com-
pliance, it is essential to consider how to structure international
environmental agreements so as to use markets to assist with
compliance. Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol envisions tradeable
emissions among Annex I industrialized countries as a way to
invoke market mechanisms to facilitate economically efficient
compliance. The 1991 Acid Rain Agreement between Canada
and the United States"' was implemented in the United
States through a tradeable emissions program for sulfur diox-
ide. It may be feasible to develop a transnational tradeable
emissions program for emission sources close to the border.
Markets permit efficient trade in private goods. They do not
address equity questions. Compliance research indicates that
the perceived equity of the obligation is an important factor in
inducing compliance. To the extent that markets are seen as
undercutting the equity of particular obligations, they could
discourage compliance by particular countries with certain obli-
gations. For example, developing countries have expressed con-
cern about the equitable effects of joint implementation and
tradeable emissions schemes authorized in the Kyoto Protocol.
Myth Number Thirteen: Compliance strategies can apply uni-
formly to states party to an international environmental agree-
ment to secure compliance.
Compliance is sometimes seen as a goal that can be achieved
only by applying a common strategy to all countries to induce
them their behavior the obligations in the agreement. The em-
111. See Agreement on Air Quality, supra note 91, T.I.A.S. 11,783, 30 I.L.M. at
676.
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pirical research in Engaging Countries suggests otherwise.
When a country joins an agreement, its intent and capacity to
comply are critical factors. These factors vary both among coun-
tries and within countries for different agreements. A state may
intend to comply or be desirous of complying but have other
more compelling priorities; conversely, it may have no intention
to comply. Similarly, it may have the capacity to comply, or
may lack any effective capacity to comply. Thus, states can be
profiled according to whether they have strong or weak inten-
tion to comply and strong or weak capacity to comply.
At least three different compliance strategies are in use.
These include coercive measures, incentives, and "sunshine"
measures. Coercive measures were discussed previously. Incen-
tives include financial support (from a special fund attached to
the agreement, the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) or other
multilateral or bilateral fund), technical cooperation, training
and capacity building programs, and incentives that may be
provided by the private sector. Sunshine methods include re-
porting, on-site monitoring, NGO participation, public access to
information, transparency in decision making, public informa-
tion measures such as newsletters, local community involve-
ment, industry monitoring, and persuasion by parties and
secretariats.' International environmental agreements rely
primarily on sunshine methods and incentives.
The particular mix of compliance strategies needed to induce
compliance with a specific agreement will vary according to the
profile of a state's intent and capacity to comply with the agree-
ment. Moreover, a state's intent and its capacity will change
over time. A dramatic change in economic wealth or a sharp
change in political leadership, for example, could significantly
affect a country's intent or its capacity to comply with its agree-
ments. Thus, a mix of compliance strategies needs to be avail-
able for each agreement. This argues for including a range of
strategies for inducing compliance in the international environ-
mental agreement.
112. See Jacobson & Brown Weiss, supra note 16, at 542-48.
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IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
By understanding the myths associated with compliance,
states should be able to design more effective compliance strate-
gies for international agreements. The realities of compliance
indicate the need to have available compliance strategies that
can be tailored to each country and to each agreement. Prob-
lems involving several large actors within states require differ-
ent compliance strategies than those that involve hundreds or
thousands of actors engaged in trade across national borders.
The myths suggest that there may be quick and easy fixes
for states to problems of compliance with their international
obligations. Understanding the myths reveals this is not the
case. Rather, compliance with international obligations requires
nuanced measures which can be adapted to different conditions
and changing circumstances.
Many, if not all, of the observations in this article apply,
with some particularized exceptions, to other areas of interna-
tional law, such as arms control, human rights, labor, and
trade. There is a need for empirical research that looks sys-
tematically at the record of national compliance with particular
agreements. Such research on international environmental
agreements has already unmasked perhaps the largest myth
regarding compliance: that a snapshot at any give time cap-
tures the status of compliance with an agreement. To the con-
trary, compliance with international obligations changes over
time. Dispelling the myths may help to understand the compli-
cated and ever-changing process of national compliance with
international environmental law and enable countries to design
and carry out more effective compliance strategies.
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